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Interpreting the EMZ: The Berlin conference to share territories in 
Africa, Caribe, and Asia. 
Economic integration of motherland territories and colonised territories 
built great empires for U.K., Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
International comparative history: the birth of new currencies 
Many of these empires framed monetary zones: 
The transition of monetary systems in the Portuguese-speaking African
countries: with João Estevão, Napoleão Gaspar, Cláudio Mandlate.
The Portuguese link to EFTA led to commitments with GATT. 
The foundation of the Escudo Monetary Zone: Decree-law 44016 of 8 November 1961
Robert Mundell’s benefits of OCAs, "A theory of optimum currency areas", American 
Economic Review 51, (1961): 657-665 :
. Common currency adoption
. Lower transaction costs, such as exchange rate risk for businesses, and 
. Scale effects resulting from the geographical expansion of businesses
. Gains in the liquidity of currency
. Asymmetrical shocks corrected with L,K mobility.
. Automatic correction for disequilibria in balances of payments
Correia de Oliveira:
Great expectations for the success of economic integration of all 
territories
Nationalism, official speeches (AHU, Overseas Historical Archives):
A political instrument to reinforce political cohesion
The EMZ: A star-shaped trade and monetary system
And 3 issuing banks
The rest of the world
It began to be implemented in March 1963 for economic development: public investment,
military spending, local private consumption (requiring Imports)
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New contracts of BNU, and Banco de Angola with the government and Banco de Portugal
New statutes for the territories (D-laws 45371 to 45375 of 22 Nov 1963).
The EMZ: An OCA? 
- Trade liberalization rules (until 1974) 
- Parity: 1:1 (28$75 escudos = 1USD, Bretton Woods system) 
- A clearing system for payments 
- Operation difficulties: (Confined spillovers via trade: inter-continental distances; CCN, and 
CNN long-distance fleets)
- Free movement of K, but subject to territories’ capacity to settle payments. Delays. 
Queuing. Parallel market.
- Failure. 
Saving-investment imbalances in monetary unions, when 
confidence problems occur, or negative expectations 
“Reserve accounts”; Banco de Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, 
and Banco de Angola; Fundos Cambiais; bilateral accounts; inter-
territorial and international payments; Multilateral Clearing using gold 
and foreign currencies of the reserve account of each territory  
FMZE= 1.5 million contos :
Automatic loan ceilings Special loan ceilings
Cape Verde 20,000 contos 40,000 contos
Guiné 45,000 contos 95,000 contos
S. Tomé e Príncipe 20,000 contos 40,000contos
Angola 250,000 contos                      500,000 contos
Mozambique 150,000 contos                      300,000 contos
Macau 7,500 contos                        12,500 contos
Timor 7,500 contos                        12,500 contos
500,000 contos 1 million contos 
The importance of the BP Historical Archives: Drs. Gil Matos, Mª Carmo Rogado, Filipe, and all 
staff 
A Board of Directors: Banco de Portugal as the central institution for 
gathering and handling gold and other international means of 
payment for the entire system. Agent of the system.
• It was difficult to issue and settle the capital of the FMZE. Monthly 
and annual reports.
• Legal and administrative matters took time to be implemented
• Tremendous bias in the reciprocity of monetary operations among 
territories. Cumulative net debtor positions with the Mainland 
Portugal  required automatic and special loans. 
• BNU resistance to tight credit policy: CGD/BNU Historical Archives
500,000 contos in a first step. Only in Sept 1963, for providing automatic loans to Guiné (25,000 contos) and Angola (95,000 
contos). The second issue of 150,000 contos, on Nov 1963, for a special loan to Angola.
• Data on balances of payments of overseas territories was late due: 
instructions to commercial banks and issuing banks for them to send monthly tables.
Pinheiro et al., vol. I. 1997; I thank also Dr. António Agostinho for motherland balances of payments. 
• A specialized staff for the EMZ accounting system, to record operations in Banco de 
Portugal.
Angola reached the ceiling for automatic loans in July 1964 and for special loans in 
Sept 1967. Mozambique in May 1966, and September 1969, respectively. 
Interest rate penalties didn’t help...
Delayed transfers waiting for the settlement of their payment. Illegal 
exchange rates for the escudos
The political dimension of the financial difficulties in the Escudo Monetary Zone:
The 1969 speech of the president of the industrial association of Angola: 
“Defense cannot always be made with guns” (Caetano, Sept 1968).
Sustainability?
Non-stationary cumulative net debit positions, or stationarity along 
a positive trend, mean that long-run equilibrium will not be reached. 
In both cases the rule is the unsustainability of a monetary union.
- Monthly cumulative net corrected positions of the EMZ partners
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Source: Relatórios Mensais do Agente, from Banco de Portugal Historical Archives.
Monthly cumulative net positions of the EMZ partners: A path-dependence process
Sources: Relatórios Mensais do Agente, from Banco de Portugal Historical Archive
A long-run divergent cobweb system
The Angolan and the Mozambican cobweb system model
Sousa, 1970
The hypothesis of a formal depreciation of the escudo of Angola and the escudo of 
Mozambique: A technical and political reflection (ANTT, ASC).
South-African The Star, “Rumours rife on escudo: rumours on an imminent escudo 
depreciation spread in the last days”. Someone from the banking sector confirmed the spread of 
those rumours, and concluded that depreciation should really occur.
“Forecasts on depreciation go from 14 to 30%, being 18% the most frequently cited”. 
17-8-1970
The EMZ reform of 1971: Reintroducing tariffs, constraints, the
increase of K of the FMZE to 3 million contos DL 479/71, 6/11/71. Territories were
authorized to raise loans, out of any responsibility of the EMZ Fund.
Local disappointment.
Entropy: Angolan payments in 1970 were in arrears 361 days! 
Mozambique had delays of 510 days!
Delays disappeared, but only for a while: Transfers queuing for 
settlement on 31-12-972 amounted to 3,279 million escudos in Angola, and 2,800 in Mozambique. 
The 1st oil shock. The Carnation Revolution. Decolonisation:
The independence of the African territories led their local economies and 
currencies: escudo, peso, dobra, kuanza, and metical.
National banks were created in Cape Verde, Guiné, Angola, Mozambique, and 
Timor, to issue money as a symbol of national sovereignty
Portuguese commissions negotiated the terms of those agreements with independence 
movements: on debts or other responsibilities of the newly-independent states, and the 
legacy of resources (such as Cahora-Bassa). I thank Dr. Robin Andrade and Arquivo Contemporâneo do 
Ministério das Finanças.
Catherine Shenk (2013: 356, 430): Decolonization cases opened a new paradigm of 
“humiliating national exposure to external pressure”,…“the end of international roles 
for European currencies (franc and £ included).
National banks of the Portuguese-speaking African countries received 
the physical resources, the local staff, and employees of the coloniser’s 
issuing banks.
The future central banks absorbed the local agencies of the old issuing 
banks (Banco de Angola in Angola, and BNU) the local offices of Banco 
de Fomento, and the local Inspecções do Comércio Bancário
Banknotes and other currency circulating at the time of independence 
continued as legal tender, until new banknotes could be issued, and 
new coins struck by the newly independent countries. 
Guinea is geographically inserted in the sub-Saharian world of the French colonial empire. 
Those territories created the West African Monetary Union: Guiné joined the WAMU in 1997: 
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Guiné-Bissau.
After the 25th of April revolution, three more loans of 250 million escudos were awarded to the 
Mozambican Exchange Fund in the imminence of a disruption of payments, (contracts of 8 May 
1974, 16 May 1974, and 2 July 1974).
Mixed groups of work made of representatives of BNU and Banco de 
Angola signed the transfer of assets, liabilities, and patrimony to local 
national banks
Banking systems were then developed, and financial systems went on 
getting sophistication with the foundation of local stock exchanges. 
1. The end of the EMZ Fund (On 20-8-1980, Portuguese D-law. 317/80).
The EMZ, a macro-political experiment! Monetary unions that are not OCAs are 
fragile and unsustainable undertakings, unless supported by substantial transfers 
from the surplus economy/ies.
2. A long-run co-operation after independences:
The 1998 Cabo Verde and 2009 S. Tomé agreements for the 1:1 parity with the
Portuguese currency (now, the euro)
The 2005-06 agreement on the move of Cahora Bassa control to Mozambican 
hands.
CONCLUSIONS
Thank you!
Mozambican debt to the motherland on 30-11-1973:
Automatic loans (contos) 150,000 
Special loans (contos) 200,000 
Loans from the 
motherland exchequer (contos)  1,500,000 
Loans from the EMZF (contos) 750,000 
Loan from the BNU(contos) 250,000
Transfers without compensation (contos) 2,315,000
Total 4,665,000 contos
Espaço económico Português, Fundo Monetário da Zona do Escudo, Sessões e Relatórios do Conselho de Direcção. Portugal. 
Arquivo Histórico do Banco de Portugal. Departamento de Serviços Jurídicos. Espaço Económico Português. Pasta nº 18.
AUTOMATIC LOANS TO 
MOZAMBIQUE: 149,279,376$05
Contract of 15/4/66 35,329,376$05
Contract of 14/5/66 113,950,000$00
SPECIAL LOANS TO ANGOLA: 600,000,000$00
Contract of 3/10/72 500,000,000$00
Contract of 13/11/72 100,000,000$00
SPECIAL LOANS TO MOZAMBIQUE: 950,000,000$00
Contract of 17/3/72 750,000,000$00
Contract of 18/2/72 50,000,000$00
Contract of 3/10/72 150,000,000$00
OTHER SPECIAL LOANS TO 
MOZAMBIQUE: 750,000,000$00
Contract of 8/5/74 250,000,000$00
Contract of 16/5/74 250,000,000$00
Contract of 2/7/74 250,000,000$00
[1] Lançamentos relativos à liquidação do Fundo Monetário d Zona do Escudo, Processo de Liquidação 
do Fundo Monetário da Zona do Escudo, Anexo 1. Portugal. Arquivo Histórico do Banco de Portugal. 
Fundo Monetário da Zona do Escudo. Direção. Processo de Liquidação. FMZE/Dir/004.
[2] Pinheiro, et al., 1997, vol. I, p. 185.
[3] “Contencioso” nr. 103, 7 May 1975. Portugal. Arquivo Histórico do Banco de Portugal. 
Departamento de Serviços Jurídicos. Espaço Económico Português. Pasta nº 16.
1980: After clearing the balances of the Exchange Funds of the territories with their debts to the EMZ Fund, 
in a multilateral way, the remaining credits resulting from the automatic and special loans to Angola 
and Mozambique amounted to 2,449,279,376$0 (about 0.2 percent of the Portuguese GDP at market prices, 
which was 1,476,316 million escudos).
The special loans were under bargaining negotiations since 1975.
The 2,449,279,376$05 awarded to Angola and Mozambique were transferred to the Portuguese state. 
Total 2,449,279,376$05 
